

Write your name here

Surname

Other names

Pearson
Edexcel GCE

Centre Number

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Candidate Number

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History

Advanced

Unit 3

Option E: War and Peace: Twentieth Century International Relations

Monday 2 June 2014 – Morning

Time: 2 hours

Paper Reference

6HI03/E

You must have:

Sources Insert (enclosed)

Total Marks

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Instructions

- Use **black** ink or ball-point pen.
- **Fill in the boxes** at the top of this page with your name, centre number and candidate number.
- There are two sections in this question paper. Answer **one** question from Section A and **one** question from Section B on the topic for which you have been prepared.
- Answer the questions in the spaces provided
– *there may be more space than you need.*

Information

- The total mark for this paper is 70.
- The marks for **each** question are shown in brackets
– *use this as a guide as to how much time to spend on each question.*
- The quality of your written communication will be assessed in **all** your responses
– *you should take particular care with your spelling, punctuation and grammar, as well as the clarity of expression.*

Advice

- Read each question carefully before you start to answer it.
- Keep an eye on the time.
- Check your answers if you have time at the end.

Turn over ►

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6HI03/E – War and Peace: Twentieth Century International Relations

SECTION A

Answer ONE question in Section A on the topic for which you have been prepared.

You should start the answer to your chosen question in Section A on page 3.

Section B begins on page 11.

E1 – The World in Crisis, 1879–1941

Answer EITHER Question 1 OR Question 2.

EITHER

- 1** ‘From 1879 to 1914 the European alliance systems were defensive in theory but offensive in practice.’

How far do you agree with this view?

(Total for Question 1 = 30 marks)

OR

- 2** To what extent did the terms of the peace treaties of 1919–23 meet the aims of the victorious powers?

(Total for Question 2 = 30 marks)

E2 – A World Divided: Superpower Relations, 1944–90

Answer EITHER Question 3 OR Question 4.

EITHER

- 3** Why did peaceful coexistence fail to end the Cold War in the years 1953–61?

(Total for Question 3 = 30 marks)

OR

- 4** ‘Sino-Soviet relations, in the years 1958–69, were undermined primarily by conflicting national interests.’

How far do you agree with this view?

(Total for Question 4 = 30 marks)

TOTAL FOR SECTION A = 30 MARKS



SECTION B

Answer ONE question in Section B on the topic for which you have been prepared.

You should start the answer to your chosen question in Section B on page 13.

E1 – The World in Crisis, 1879–1941

Study the relevant sources in the Sources Insert.

Answer EITHER Question 5 OR Question 6.

EITHER

5 Use Sources 1, 2 and 3 and your own knowledge.

How far do you agree that the main reason for the failure of the League of Nations was the League's association 'with defeat and disillusionment'? (Source 1, line 5)

Explain your answer, using Sources 1, 2 and 3 and your own knowledge of the issues related to this controversy.

(Total for Question 5 = 40 marks)

OR

6 Use Sources 4, 5 and 6 and your own knowledge.

How far was the outbreak of war in Europe in September 1939 due to differences in ideology?

Explain your answer, using Sources 4, 5 and 6 and your own knowledge of the issues related to this controversy.

(Total for Question 6 = 40 marks)



E2 – A World Divided: Superpower Relations, 1944–90

**Study the relevant sources in the Sources Insert.
Answer EITHER Question 7 OR Question 8.**

EITHER

7 Use Sources 7, 8 and 9 and your own knowledge.

How far do you agree with the view that the development of the Cold War in the years 1945–49 was mainly due to ‘Stalin’s own errors’? (Source 7, line 1)

Explain your answer, using Sources 7, 8 and 9 and your own knowledge of the issues related to this controversy.

(Total for Question 7 = 40 marks)

OR

8 Use Sources 10, 11 and 12 and your own knowledge.

‘The Cold War came to an end in the late 1980s primarily because of Soviet economic and technological inferiority.’

How far do you agree with this view?

Explain your answer, using Sources 10, 11 and 12 and your own knowledge of the issues related to this controversy.

(Total for Question 8 = 40 marks)

TOTAL FOR SECTION B = 40 MARKS



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Sources Insert – Section B

Paper Reference

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Do not return the insert with the question paper.

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Sources for use with Section B. Answer ONE question in Section B on the topic for which you have been prepared.

E1 – The World in Crisis, 1879–1941

Sources for use with Question 5

SOURCE 1

(From F. H. Hinsley, *Power and the Pursuit of Peace*, published 1963)

It was a misfortune for the League of Nations that it was brought into existence in conditions of unusual international instability. Although the League was sound in conception, the principles behind it were faultily applied. Those who hold this view argue that the Covenant should never have been incorporated in the Treaty of Versailles: this associated the League with defeat and disillusionment in the minds of some and with the maintenance of an unstable international system in the minds of others. Furthermore, there are those who stress that it was a grave tactical error not to admit the defeated states at once and on an equal footing with the victorious Powers.

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SOURCE 2

(From Ruth B. Henig (ed.), *The League of Nations*, published 1973)

The slump of 1929 cast a dark shadow over the League, which was lengthened by the Manchurian crisis of 1931. Caught in severe economic and political cross-currents, nations cast about for traditional national principles to guide their policies instead of looking to the League for the possibility of internationally concerted action. Hitler worsened the situation for the League. It was in his interest to weaken any existing international body which could conceivably check his expansionist designs. He did not find it difficult to undermine members' faith in the League's disarmament machinery at the League Disarmament Conference of 1931–3. Mussolini completed the destruction of the League by exposing the inadequacies of the League as a peace-keeping body. After the conquest of Abyssinia and Hitler's re-occupation of the Rhineland, the League ceased to count as an international centre of any importance.

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SOURCE 3

(From Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, published 1988)

Many of the participants at the Paris negotiations in 1919 felt that, like Lloyd George, they could look to the newly created League of Nations 'to remedy, to repair, and to redress ... [It] will be there as a Court of Appeal to tackle irregularities and injustices.' Surely any outstanding political or economic quarrel between states could now be settled by reasonable men meeting around a table in Geneva. That again seemed a reasonable assumption to make in 1919, but it was to be wrecked on the rocks of hard reality. The United States would not join the League. The Soviet Union was treated as a outcast and kept out of the League. So, too, were the defeated powers, at least for the first few years. When the revisionist states commenced their aggressions in the 1930s, they soon thereafter left the League.

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E1 – The World in Crisis, 1879–1941

Sources for use with Question 6

SOURCE 4

(From Richard Overy, *The Road To War*, revised edition published 1999)

Fascism was for Western populations by 1939 a demonstrably evil cause. The war was seen not simply as one set of self-interested powers against another, but right against might, good against evil. In practice, of course, both the British and French governments pursued the strategy that they judged to be in the interests of the empires they guided. The ideological divide helped to create a greater degree of political unity and enthusiasm for confrontation in the democracies. However, the conflict at the end of the 1930s was really about national rivalry and great-power status as much as it was about ideology. It was the threat of German domination, and everything that would flow from that for the political future of the decaying imperial structures, that forced Britain and France, reluctantly, to choose to fight if Hitler insisted on it.

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SOURCE 5

(From Ian Kershaw, *Hitler 1936–1945: Nemesis*, published 2001)

The British Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, told the House of Commons on 1 September 1939 that ‘Responsibility for this terrible catastrophe lies on the shoulders of one man, the German Chancellor, who has not hesitated to plunge the world into misery in order to serve his own senseless ambitions’. It was an understandable over-simplification. Such a personalised view necessarily left out the failings of others – including the British government and its French allies – which had assisted in enabling Hitler to accumulate such a unique basis of power that his actions could determine the fate of Europe. Internationally, Hitler’s combination of bullying and blackmail could not have worked but for the fragility of the post-war European settlement. The Treaty of Versailles had given Hitler the basis for rising demands, accelerating drastically in 1938–9.

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SOURCE 6

(From Karl Dietrich Bracher, *The German Dictatorship*, published 1973)

There is no question of war guilt for 1939. Germany bears full responsibility. Neither the many reasons of the early post-war years, Soviet co-responsibility, nor the West’s failure in its dealings with Hitler can alter this. Chamberlain, in a letter to Hitler dated 22 August, also left no doubt about Britain’s determination to honour its Polish commitment. A proposal for a division of political spheres between Germany and Britain, still circulated by Hitler on 25 August, completely misread British policy. Against the doubts of the generals and political experts, Hitler and his ‘England expert’, Ribbentrop, apparently believed to the very last that the planned *Blitzkrieg* could be localised. The Second World War was a National Socialist war.

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Sources for use with Section B. Answer ONE question in Section B on the topic for which you have been prepared.

E2 – A World Divided: Superpower Relations, 1944–90

Sources for use with Question 7

SOURCE 7

(From Tony Judt, *Postwar: A History of Europe*, published 2005)

The immediate cause of the division of Germany and Europe lies in Stalin's own errors in these years. In central Europe, where he would have preferred a united Germany, weak and neutral, he squandered his advantage in 1945 and subsequent years by uncompromising rigidity and confrontational tactics. If Stalin's hope had been to let Germany rot until the fruit of German resentment and hopelessness fell into his lap, then he miscalculated seriously. In that sense the Cold War in Europe was an unavoidable outcome of the Soviet dictator's personality and the system over which he ruled.

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SOURCE 8

(From John Lewis Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War 1941–1947*, published 1972)

The Cold War grew out of a complicated interaction of external and internal developments inside both the United States and the Soviet Union. The external situation – circumstances beyond the control of either power – left Americans and Russians facing one another across devastated Europe at the end of World War II. Internal influences in the Soviet Union – the search for security, the role of ideology, massive post-war reconstruction needs, the personality of Stalin – together with those in the United States – the ideal of self-determination, fear of communism, the illusion of being all-powerful fostered by American economic strength and the atomic bomb – made the resulting confrontation a hostile one. Leaders of both superpowers sought peace, but in doing so yielded to considerations which, while they did not trigger war, made a resolution of differences impossible.

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SOURCE 9

(From Martin McCauley, *Origins of the Cold War*, revised 3rd edition published 2008)

The liberal capitalist US economy needed ever-increasing trade and investment opportunities. This produced the 'open door' policy so the United States could have 'equal opportunity' in all foreign markets. Since the US was the leading economic power, this policy could only lead to increasing American economic and political domination. The Marshall Plan was designed to implant an informal American empire in Europe, and thereby to extend American political influence over the USSR itself. When the Soviet will to resist could not be broken, the Americans settled for their sphere of influence. Under the guise of containing Soviet global expansion, from 1946 the US pursued a policy which led to the division of Germany and Europe. The Truman Doctrine of 1947 was the political equivalent of the Marshall Plan.

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E2 – A World Divided: Superpower Relations, 1944–90

Sources for use with Question 8

SOURCE 10

(From Mike Sewell, *The Cold War*, published 2002)

As the 1980s progressed, it became clear that Soviet and other communist leaders were facing a crisis. Their Western counterparts, who had excellent intelligence-gathering systems, knew better than the Soviets did about how bad things were. George Shultz recalls trying to educate Gorbachev about the realities of economic and political life in the 'information age'. High levels of hard-currency debt plagued most Comecon countries. East Germany's apparent success was, in fact, due to huge subsidies from Moscow and massive injections of cash from Bonn – the country was actually close to bankruptcy. The Soviet satellite states had not modernised or rationalised their economies. The knowledge and skills-based global economy of the advanced countries put a premium on high technology and effective flows of information that was bewildering to those who had risen through the Soviet system.

SOURCE 11

(From Jonathan Haslam, *Russia's Cold War*, published 2011)

Soviet concessions to the West in negotiations were driven by pressure from outside, not least fear of SDI – the INF treaty is a prime example. In this critical sense, whether one likes to admit it or not, the Carter-Reagan build-up in counterforce systems, the anti-communist zeal within Reagan's administration, and the US obsession with space-based defence played a key role in the unravelling of Soviet security policy across the board. It took a considerable time for Gorbachev to realise that to end the Cold War nuclear disarmament alone was insufficient and that a fundamental revision of security policy in Central and Eastern Europe was also required.

SOURCE 12

(From an article by Raymond L. Garthoff, in *Diplomatic History*, published 1992)

The West did not, as is widely believed, win the Cold War through geopolitical containment and military deterrence. Nor was the Cold War won by the Reagan military build-up and the Reagan Doctrine, as some have suggested. Instead, 'victory' for the West came when a new generation of Soviet leaders realised how badly their system at home and their policies abroad had failed. Only a Soviet leader could have ended the Cold War and Gorbachev set out deliberately to do so. He was the first to recognise that mutual political accommodation, rather than military power for deterrence or counter-deterrence, was the defining core of the Soviet Union's relationship with the rest of the world. The conclusions that Gorbachev drew from this recognition, and the subsequent Soviet actions, finally permitted the Iron Curtain to be dismantled and ended the global confrontation of the Cold War.

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