Instructions

- Use black ink or ball-point pen.
- Fill in the boxes at the top of this page with your name, centre number and candidate number.
- Answer question part (a) and part (b) of the topic for which you have been prepared. There is a choice of questions in part (b).
- Answer the questions in the spaces provided – there may be more space than you need.

Information

- The total mark for this paper is 60.
- The marks for each question are shown in brackets – use this as a guide as to how much time to spend on each question.
- Questions labelled with an asterisk (*) are ones where the quality of your written communication will be assessed – you should take particular care with your spelling, punctuation and grammar, as well as the clarity of expression, on these questions.

Advice

- Read each question carefully before you start to answer it.
- Keep an eye on the time.
- Check your answers if you have time at the end.
Choose EITHER D1 (Question 1) OR D2 (Question 2) for which you have been prepared.

D1 – Britain and Ireland, 1867–1922

Study the relevant sources in the Sources Insert.
Answer Question 1, parts (a) and (b). There is a choice of questions in part (b).

You should start the answer to part (a) on page 4.
You should start the answer to part (b) (i) OR part (b) (ii) on page 9.

Question 1

Answer part (a) and then answer EITHER part (b) (i) OR part (b) (ii).

(a) Study Sources 1, 2 and 3.

How far do the sources suggest that the divisions between Nationalists and Unionists were already beyond repair by the time of the debates over the First Home Rule Bill in 1886?

Explain your answer, using the evidence of Sources 1, 2 and 3.

(20)

EITHER

*(b) (i) Use Sources 4, 5 and 6 and your own knowledge.

Do you agree with the view that in the autumn of 1914 ‘civil war was nearly inevitable’ in Ireland (Source 4, line 20)?

Explain your answer, using Sources 4, 5 and 6 and your own knowledge.

(40)

OR

*(b) (ii) Use Sources 7, 8 and 9 and your own knowledge.

Do you agree with the view that the growth of support for Sinn Féin in the years 1916–18 was primarily due to the policies and actions of the British government?

Explain your answer, using Sources 7, 8 and 9 and your own knowledge.

(40)

(Total for Question 1 = 60 marks)
6HI02/D – The British Empire Challenged

Choose EITHER D1 (Question 1) OR D2 (Question 2) for which you have been prepared.

D2 – Britain and the Nationalist Challenge in India, 1900–47

Study the relevant sources in the Sources Insert.
Answer Question 2, parts (a) and (b). There is a choice of questions in part (b).

You should start the answer to part (a) on page 4.
You should start the answer to part (b) (i) OR part (b) (ii) on page 9.

Question 2

Answer part (a) and then answer EITHER part (b) (i) OR part (b) (ii).

(a) Study Sources 10, 11 and 12.

How far do the sources suggest that Lord Curzon's policies in India were designed to improve the lives of Indians?

Explain your answer, using the evidence of Sources 10, 11 and 12.

(20)

EITHER

*(b) (i) Use Sources 13, 14 and 15 and your own knowledge.

Do you agree with the view that British policy in India in the years 1918–39 steadily ‘weakened the Raj’s grip on the subcontinent’ (Source 13, line 21)?

Explain your answer, using Sources 13, 14 and 15 and your own knowledge.

(40)

OR

*(b) (ii) Use Sources 16, 17 and 18 and your own knowledge.

Do you agree with the view that the Partition of 1947 was the consequence of Muhammad Ali Jinnah’s campaign for a separate nation?

Explain your answer, using Sources 16, 17 and 18 and your own knowledge.

(40)

(Total for Question 2 = 60 marks)
Indicate which question you are answering by marking a cross in the box ✗. If you change your mind, put a line through the box ✗ and then indicate your new question with a cross ✗.

Chosen Question Number:

| Question 1 | ✗ | Question 2 | ✗ |

(a) ______________________________________________________
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(a) continued
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Answer EITHER part (b) (i) OR part (b) (ii) of your chosen question.

*(b)*
(b) continued
(b) continued
(b) continued
Choose EITHER D1 (Question 1) OR D2 (Question 2) for which you have been prepared.

D1 – Britain and Ireland, 1867–1922

Sources for use with Question 1 (a)

SOURCE 1
(From a speech made by Charles Stewart Parnell MP, leader of the Irish Nationalists, in the House of Commons during the second reading of the Home Rule Bill, 7 June 1886)

1 We recognise the great abilities and the industry of the Irish Protestants freely and fully, and we do not blame the small proportion of the Protestants of Ireland who feel any real fear. We have been doing our best to calm that fear, and we shall continue to do so. Theirs is not the shame and disgrace of this fear. That shame and disgrace belong to the English political parties who, for selfish interests, have sought to relight the dying fires of religious bigotry.

SOURCE 2
(From the Irish Loyal and Patriotic Union, *Union or Separation*, published 1886. This group was formed by Belfast Unionists in 1885 to oppose Home Rule.)

Let us suppose for a moment that Mr Parnell represents the sentiments of half of the people of Ireland – let us see of what that half is composed. It consists of the lowest half of the population; of tenant farmers on a small scale, of labourers, but chiefly of the disaffected masses who have been taught for the past forty years to hate everything English. An Irish Parliament will have full power to give effect to their hostility.

SOURCE 3
(From A. V. Dicey, *England's Case Against Home Rule*, published 1886. Dicey was an English academic and Liberal Unionist.)

Mr Parnell and his followers appear to accept in principle Mr Gladstone's proposals. They are therefore willing to compromise in accepting for Ireland restrictions on her political liberty which would seem to be absolutely inconsistent with their principle of nationality. Under Mr Gladstone's Home Rule Bill, Ireland's foreign policy is to be wholly regulated by a British Parliament. Ireland is, in fact, to surrender any claim to the rights of a nation in return for receiving a certain number of state-rights.
Sources for use with Question 1 (b) (i)

SOURCE 4
(From James Lydon, The Making of Ireland, published 1998)

In the autumn of 1914, the militarization of Ireland by groups who were politically opposed to one another, created a situation in which civil war was nearly inevitable. Home Rule would be forcibly resisted by the UVF who would defend a new Ulster as part of the United Kingdom. Conservative support for the Unionists was so strong in Britain that English involvement in an armed struggle could not be ruled out. The Irish Volunteers, nominally under the command of Redmond and the Irish Nationalists, would insist on a separate parliament for the whole of Ireland.

SOURCE 5

It may well be that Asquith was banking on the likelihood that the Unionists were bluffing and he could force them to postpone their ‘decisive action’ until the parliamentary recess had begun. In these circumstances, certainly in the view of one very senior and experienced Unionist strategist, the Ulster rebellion would have been a fiasco. Even as it was, some slight but suggestive divisions were beginning to open up within the Ulster Unionist leadership by the end of July 1914.

SOURCE 6
(From a memo written by Joe Devlin to the British Cabinet, 20 February 1914. Devlin was a Nationalist MP from Ulster.)

We have exceptional sources of information in regard to the Ulster Volunteer movement, and we are convinced that its danger is grossly exaggerated. The main ground for this conviction is that in Belfast, the headquarters of the UVF, the Home Rulers would be among the first victims of any outbreak among the Orangemen, and they regard the whole thing with absolute contempt. They are astonished that anybody outside Belfast should take it seriously.
Sources for use with Question 1 (b) (ii)

SOURCE 7

> From its new start in 1917, Sinn Féin strove incessantly to overcome differences between Irish people, as in its successful attempts to persuade the Labour party to stand down in the 1918 election. By the time that election came, public opinion had been thoroughly roused by the execution of the major leaders of the abortive 1916 rising and by the threat of the introduction of conscription in Ireland in April 1918. These two events antagonised a wide range of southern Irish opinion and consolidated it behind the separatist option provided by Sinn Féin.

SOURCE 8
(From the *Report on the Present State of Ireland, Especially with Regard to Conscription*, a private report produced by the British War Office for Lloyd George, the Prime Minister, 29 April 1918)

> Ireland from north to south appears at the present moment to be solidly united against conscription. With the exception of one or two wounded men returned from the Front, I have not heard one word in favour of it, but on the contrary, bitter hatred is shown by all classes of people, other than the ruling class.

SOURCE 9
(From Jeremy Smith, *Britain and Ireland: From Home Rule to Independence*, published 2000)

> The success of Sinn Féin in the 1918 election, where they won 70% of the seats, owed something to the widespread intimidation of voters and impersonation. It is also conceivable that much of Sinn Féin's support represented a rejection of the old Redmondite party, rather than approval of republicanism or a glowing endorsement for Sinn Féin and its objectives. Few understood what Sinn Féin stood for, a vagueness that probably helped its unity and electoral appeal.
Choose EITHER D1 (Question 1) OR D2 (Question 2) for which you have been prepared.

D2 – Britain and the Nationalist Challenge in India, 1900–47

Sources for use with Question 2 (a)

SOURCE 10
(From H. Caldwell Lipsett, *Lord Curzon in India 1898–1903*, published 1903. Lord Curzon was Viceroy at this time. Lipsett was a British journalist who spent time in India.)

1 Curzon is not entirely liked by the natives because, although his consideration for their welfare appeals to them, his Imperial sentiments identify him thoroughly with the dominant race. To every subject that has been laid before him during his term of office, he has brought an open mind. Between the conflicting interests of European and native, he keeps the scales even. He was responsible for the punishment of some British soldiers at Rangoon who had murdered a native woman.

SOURCE 11
(From an article published in *New India*, a weekly newspaper, 1905. It was written in English and its owner was a member of the Indian National Congress.)

Curzon has been trying to win the goodwill of the people, and to prevent any powerful combination between them and the educated middle classes. Reduction of land taxes, creation of agricultural banks, revision of the famine code, the introduction of a new irrigation policy – all these are clearly meant to bring the present rule and the present regime into favour with the immense agricultural population of this country.

SOURCE 12
(From a speech made by Gopal Krishna Gokhale to the Indian National Congress in 1905. He was a moderate member of the INC and is speaking about Curzon’s partition of Bengal.)

A cruel wrong has been inflicted on Bengal. The scheme of partition will always stand as a complete illustration of the worst features of the present system of bureaucratic rule – its utter contempt for public opinion, its arrogant pretensions to superior wisdom, its reckless disregard of the most cherished feelings of the people. Any appeal to its sense of justice is a mockery.
Sources for use with Question 2 (b) (i)

SOURCE 13
(From Ian Copland, *India 1885–1947*, published 2001)

The British liberalised their governance of India grudgingly and with grave reservations. With each concession, some ground was lost. By the 1930s, the constitutional reform process, in conjunction with the steady Indianisation of the Indian Civil Service, had appreciably weakened the Raj’s grip on the subcontinent. Moreover, once started the process was almost irreversible. Each instalment of reform raised Indian appetites for freedom. These rising expectations could only be met by blanket repression (at best, only a temporary option) or further concessions, leading to a further erosion of authority.

SOURCE 14
(From Piers Brendon, *The Decline and Fall of the British Empire, 1781–1997*, published 2007)

The British tried to temper coercion with conciliation, notably through the 1935 Government of India Act. The Viceroy retained ultimate control: he could veto laws, dismiss ministers and suspend the constitution. The Act was thus intended to divide and outflank Indian nationalism, not to be a stage in a slow unending retreat from the Raj. The Act seemed to invent new means of maintaining British rule.

SOURCE 15
(From V. H. Rutherford, *Modern India*, published 1927. Rutherford was a Labour MP and here he is describing events between 1924 and 1927.)

When Mr Baldwin, the Prime Minister, and Lord Birkenhead, the Secretary of State for India, talk about goodwill and co-operation, Indian patriots are not deceived. They know by experience this means keeping things as they are while they and their country are exploited. Lord Birkenhead made this perfectly clear when he said “I am not able in any foreseeable future to discover a moment when we may safely, either to ourselves or India, abandon our trust.” Indians interpret this declaration as a betrayal of India and an abandonment of the policy of goodwill and co-operation decided upon by the House of Commons in 1917.
Sources for use with Question 2 (b) (ii)

SOURCE 16
(From an address by Muhammad Ali Jinnah to the Muslim League at Lahore, 1940)

If the British Government is really in earnest about securing the peace and happiness of the sub-continent, the only course open to us all is to allow the major nations separate homelands by dividing India into autonomous national states. To yoke together two nations under a single state, one as a numerical minority and the other as a majority, must lead to growing discontent. The present artificial unity of India dates back only to the British conquest and is maintained by the British bayonet.

SOURCE 17
(From Lawrence James, The Illustrated Rise and Fall of the British Empire, published 1994)

Mountbatten arrived in India at the end of March 1947. He threw himself into his tasks with immense zeal and energy, using every ounce of his charm to persuade and cajole India’s politicians, although he was brusque with Jinnah to the point of rudeness. However, no number of intricate political manoeuvres could have prevented the polarisation of India and preserved it as a single country.

SOURCE 18
(From Stanley Wolpert, Shameful Flight, published 2006)

The Prime Minister hoped that Mountbatten might, within fourteen months, bring Gandhi, Nehru and Jinnah round his viceregal table, teasing agreement from them to resolve their own problems. Britain could then withdraw its troops with dignity and take credit for leaving independent India unified. But Mountbatten was neither wise enough nor patient enough to accomplish what many older and more experienced British predecessors had failed to do. Nor did he have the humility or good sense to listen to India’s two wisest political leaders, Gandhi and Jinnah, both of whom tried their frail best to warn him to stop the runaway juggernaut to Partition before it was too late.

Acknowledgements

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