Edexcel GCE
History
Advanced
Unit 3
Option D: The Challenge of Fascism

Monday 3 June 2013 – Morning
Time: 2 hours

You must have:
Sources Insert (enclosed)

Total Marks

Instructions
• Use black ink or ball-point pen.
• Fill in the boxes at the top of this page with your name, centre number and candidate number.
• There are two sections in this question paper. Answer one question from Section A and one question from Section B on the topic for which you have been prepared.
• Answer the questions in the spaces provided — there may be more space than you need.

Information
• The total mark for this paper is 70.
• The marks for each question are shown in brackets — use this as a guide as to how much time to spend on each question.
• The quality of your written communication will be assessed in all your responses — you should take particular care with your spelling, punctuation and grammar, as well as the clarity of expression.
• This paper has two unit codes. Unit 3 6H103/F Topic D1 — From Kaiser to Führer: Germany, 1900–45 is a prohibited combination with Unit 1 6H101/F.

Advice
• Read each question carefully before you start to answer it.
• Keep an eye on the time.
• Check your answers if you have time at the end.
SECTION A

Answer ONE question in Section A on the topic for which you have been prepared.

You should start the answer to your chosen question in Section A on page 3. Section B begins on page 11.

D1 – From Kaiser to Führer: Germany, 1900–45

Answer EITHER Question 1 OR Question 2.

EITHER

1. To what extent did the social and political tensions that existed within the Second Reich increase during the First World War?

(Total for Question 1 = 30 marks)

OR

2. How far do you agree that the new Weimar Republic was seriously threatened by political extremists in the years 1919–24?

(Total for Question 2 = 30 marks)

D2 – Britain and the Challenge of Fascism: Saving Europe at a Cost? c1925–60

Answer EITHER Question 3 OR Question 4.

EITHER

3. To what extent did the bomber offensive of 1942–45 against Germany contribute towards the allies’ ultimate victory in western Europe?

(Total for Question 3 = 30 marks)

OR

4. How far did the Second World War produce social change in Britain in the years 1939–45?

(Total for Question 4 = 30 marks)

TOTAL FOR SECTION A = 30 MARKS
SECTION A

Put a cross in the box indicating the first question you have chosen to answer ☐. If you change your mind, put a line through the box ☒ and then put a cross in another box ☐.

Chosen Question Number:

Question 1 ☐ Question 2 ☐
Question 3 ☐ Question 4 ☐
(Section A continued)
SECTION B

Answer ONE question in Section B on the topic for which you have been prepared.

You should start the answer to your chosen question in Section B on page 13.

D1 – From Kaiser to Führer: Germany, 1900–45

Study the relevant sources in the Sources Insert.
Answer EITHER Question 5 OR Question 6.

EITHER

5 Use Sources 1, 2 and 3 and your own knowledge.

‘The First World War arose primarily as a result of German aggression.’ How far do you agree with this opinion?

Explain your answer, using Sources 1, 2 and 3 and your own knowledge of the issues related to this controversy.

(Total for Question 5 = 40 marks)

OR

6 Use Sources 4, 5 and 6 and your own knowledge.

How far do you agree with the view that ‘After 1933 most Germans readily accepted the Führer, Adolf Hitler’ (Source 4, line 30)?

Explain your answer, using Sources 4, 5 and 6 and your own knowledge of the issues related to this controversy.

(Total for Question 6 = 40 marks)
D2 – Britain and the Challenge of Fascism: Saving Europe at a Cost? c1925–60

Study the relevant sources in the Sources Insert.
Answer EITHER Question 7 OR Question 8.

EITHER

7 Use Sources 7, 8 and 9 and your own knowledge.
   How far do you agree with the view that the Munich Agreement was a strategic
   disaster for Britain?
   Explain your answer, using Sources 7, 8 and 9 and your own knowledge of the issues
   related to this controversy.

   (Total for Question 7 = 40 marks)

OR

8 Use Sources 10, 11 and 12 and your own knowledge.
   How far do you agree with the view that, in the years after the war, there was a popular
   belief in socialism and the power of the state to do good?
   Explain your answer, using the evidence of Sources 10, 11 and 12 and your own
   knowledge of the issues related to this controversy.

   (Total for Question 8 = 40 marks)

TOTAL FOR SECTION B = 40 MARKS
SECTION B

Put a cross in the box indicating the second question you have chosen to answer ☑. If you change your mind, put a line through the box ☒ and then put a cross in another box ☑.

Chosen Question Number:

Question 5 ☐          Question 6 ☐
Question 7 ☐          Question 8 ☐
(Section B continued)
(Section B continued)
D1 – From Kaiser to Führer: Germany, 1900–45

Sources for use with Question 5

**SOURCE 1**

1 The continuation of peace would have brought Germany the mastery of Europe within a few years. This was prevented by the habit of her diplomacy and, still more, by the mental outlook of her people. They had trained themselves psychologically for aggression.

5 The German military plans played a vital part. The other Great Powers thought in terms of defending themselves. No Frenchman thought seriously of recovering Alsace and Lorraine; and the struggle of Slavs and Germans in the Balkans was very great nonsense as far as most Russians were concerned. The German generals wanted a decisive victory for its own sake. Though they complained of ‘encirclement’, it was German policy that had created this encirclement.

**SOURCE 2**
(From Modris Eckstein, *Rites of Spring; the Great War and the Birth of the Modern Age*, published 1989)

The idea that this was a ‘preventative war’, to forestall the aggressive designs of the hostile powers surrounding Germany, was certainly a part of the thinking of men like Tirpitz and Moltke. Yet these defensive considerations, while often discussed, were invariably overwhelmed by a grand sense of German power, whose time, it was felt, had come. The two aspects, the practical response to threat and the grand sense of national power, were not mutually exclusive, as so many historians who have debated the war aims have implied; both were essential ingredients of the German personality on the eve of the war.

**SOURCE 3**
(From Michael Howard, *The Oxford History of the Twentieth Century*, published 1998)

British diplomacy was seen in Germany as a deliberate attempt at encirclement in order to prevent the assertion of Germany’s legitimate aspirations. By 1914, the mutual suspicion and dislike between the two powers had reached the intensity almost of a cold war. But when war did come, it broke out at the other side of Europe. It arose from rivalry between the Habsburg Monarchy and Russia over the succession to the disintegrating empire of the Turks in the Balkan peninsula. In such a confrontation, Russia felt bound to support Serbia, and Austria-Hungary needed German support to confront Russia. This was forthcoming. Germany could not afford to see its only ally disintegrate, and was increasingly alarmed by the growth of Russian power. War with Russia would certainly involve war with Russia’s ally, France.
D1 – From Kaiser to Führer: Germany, 1900–45

Sources for use with Question 6

SOURCE 4
(From Alf Lüdtke, German Workers and the Limits of Resistance, published 1999)

After 1933 most Germans readily accepted the Führer, Adolf Hitler, and many actively supported him. In general, the goals of Nazi leaders, such as ‘restoring’ the grandeur of the Reich and ‘cleaning out’ alleged ‘aliens’ in politics and society, were widely cheered. Critical comments about, for instance, the demonstrative brutality of the SA, or the arrogance of party functionaries, were only rarely pushed into public consciousness. The popular approach to coping with demands from above did not challenge the Nazi methods of political domination. The vast majority of industrial workers tried to pursue their immediate interests by obtaining jobs and earning higher wages. Very few extended their criticisms of neighbourhood issues or mismanagement and injustice on the shop floor to criticism of the political regime as a whole.

SOURCE 5
(From Robert Gellately, Backing Hitler, published 2001)

There were at most only 3,000 prisoners in the camps by the end of 1934 and that was the lowest point they ever reached in the Third Reich. The decline was accelerated by a Hitler amnesty of 7 August 1934. Shortly thereafter there were less than 500 prisoners in all Prussian camps and by the end of the year only around 1,600 in Bavaria. It made perfect sense to close the camps, because by 1934–35 the country was positively inclined towards Hitler’s dictatorship. Organized opposition was silent or as good as dead. The surprise was, that for all Hitler’s popularity and the social consensus that supported the new regime, the camps did not disappear.

SOURCE 6
(From Pierre Ayçoberry, The Social History of the Third Reich, published 2000)

Once appointed inspector-general, Eicke was able to extend the ‘Dachau model’ to other regular camps. Nevertheless, their geographic distribution remained uncertain until 1936, when economic imperatives (the mobilisation of labour for great urban development projects) and policing needs dictated the solution of building giant camps. After Dachau, a series of camps were opened in Sachsenhausen near Berlin, Buchenwald near Weimar, Flossenburg near the Czech frontier, Mauthausen, once Austria was annexed, and finally Ravensbruck in Mecklenburg, for women. On the eve of the war, about twenty-five thousand prisoners were in the hands of 14,000 ‘Death’s Head’ SS: the system was thus still potentially extendable, as had been shown at the time of the waves of arrests of Jews in 1938.
Sources for use with Section B. Answer ONE question in Section B on the topic for which you have been prepared.

D2 – Britain and the Challenge of Fascism: Saving Europe at a Cost? c1925–60

Sources for use with Question 7

SOURCE 7

In every respect Munich was a strategic disaster for the Western Powers. In the autumn of 1938, the military situation was still relatively favourable to them. Whatever the weaknesses of their air defences, they faced little threat from a Luftwaffe which was running at 50% capacity throughout summer 1938 and which possessed no capability to execute bombing attacks against British cities. Moreover, Germany possessed only three Panzer divisions, so that the German Army could not launch a decisive campaign against the French Army. While the Czechs would probably not have lasted much longer than the Poles did the following year, they would have inflicted heavier casualties on the Germans. Moreover, war against the Czechs would have destroyed most of the equipment that fell into German hands in undamaged condition the following year and would probably have severely damaged the Czech armaments industry as well. As for their long term prospects, the Germans confronted an even more serious situation. They were in the midst of a serious economic crisis; the Reich possessed virtually no stocks of raw materials; and Germany’s neighbours, with the possible exception of the Hungarians, were almost uniformly hostile.

SOURCE 8
(From Richard Overy, The Road to War, published 1989)

The overwhelming bulk of the British population was still repelled by the prospect of war, particularly ‘continental entanglements’; many were hostile even to increased levels of rearmament, so that the government was compelled to soften the blow of increased taxes and defence spending through an orchestrated propaganda campaign in the press and cinema. The popular attitude to the Czech issue was fragmented. In the Empire as a whole the issue was much clearer. All the Dominions except New Zealand were hostile to the idea of fighting for Czechoslovakia. The fear of Empire disunity was an important one for Chamberlain, as it would have been for any British Prime Minister. Chamberlain was sensitive to public opinion and very aware of the difficulty of taking a divided country and a divided empire into war.

SOURCE 9
(From Gerhard L. Weinberg, Germany, Hitler and World War II, published 1995)

Startled by Chamberlain’s offer to come to Germany, Hitler immediately feared that the war he intended might somehow be averted – that he might by circumstances be forced to settle for less than what he actually intended: the destruction of Czechoslovakia. He could not afford the domestic and international repercussions of refusing to see the British prime minister, but all the evidence shows that a military, not a diplomatic, resolution of the crisis remained his goal.
D2 – Britain and the Challenge of Fascism: Saving Europe at a Cost? c1925–60

Sources for use with Question 8

SOURCE 10
(From David Kynaston, A World to Build 1945–48, published 2007)

During the war there was a comfortable, almost automatic assumption on the part of Labour politicians and activists that the conflict was producing a more egalitarian society and thus a more serious-minded, socialist people. Herbert Morrison, a leading Labour political figure, for example, was apparently convinced by the spring of 1944 that there existed a ‘genuine social idealism,’ reflecting the ‘altered moral sense of the community’. He believed that the British people were ‘moving into an altogether different form of society, working in an altogether different atmosphere of ideas’. This was a revolution in outlook, shifting from the values of private enterprise to the values of socialism. For Morrison, this meant that the people would never again ‘be content with limited and material aims.’

SOURCE 11
(From Geoff Stewart, British Political History 1945–1990: Consensus and Conflict, published 2010)

In the country at large there were signs of discontent. Labour lost control of the London County Council in 1949, which it had held before with a large majority of 90 to 28. A middle-class pressure group, the ‘Housewives League’, was established and complained about rationing, queuing and all the petty indignities and controls of life under Labour. Some of these controls could be remarkably stupid.

The mood of the country in the late 1940s became almost rebellious and was expressed in two popular films of 1949, ‘Passport to Pimlico’ and ‘Whisky Galore’. Both celebrated the triumph of the individual and illegal appetites over the all-controlling state. The first imagined a part of London freed from the all-embracing regulations of Labour Britain and the joys this would entail. The title of the other, set on a Scottish island, almost speaks for its theme. Both celebrated freedom and satirised the controlling bureaucracy. By 1949, after nine years of high-minded self-denial in the name of a greater good, there was clearly a growing demand for freedom and choice.

SOURCE 12

The belief in the power of the state, which had been all the rage in the 1930s, lost its charm in the highly regimented England of the war and post-war years. A very influential book at the time was Professor F A Hayek’s ‘Road to Serfdom’, published in 1944. It was essentially anti-socialist in its implications. The universities saw a notable revival of conservative sympathies among the undergraduates and to some extent among the professors too.
Acknowledgements

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