Instructions

- Use black ink or ball-point pen.
- Fill in the boxes at the top of this page with your name, centre number and candidate number.
- There are two sections in this question paper. Answer one question from Section A and one question from Section B on the topic for which you have been prepared.
- Answer the questions in the spaces provided – there may be more space than you need.

Information

- The total mark for this paper is 70.
- The marks for each question are shown in brackets – use this as a guide as to how much time to spend on each question.
- The quality of your written communication will be assessed in all your responses – you should take particular care with your spelling, punctuation and grammar, as well as the clarity of expression.

Advice

- Read each question carefully before you start to answer it.
- Keep an eye on the time.
- Check your answers if you have time at the end.
6HI03/E – War and Peace: Twentieth Century International Relations

SECTION A

Answer ONE question in Section A on the topic for which you have been prepared.

You should start the answer to your chosen question in Section A on page 3. Section B begins on page 11.

E1 – The World in Crisis, 1879–1941

Answer EITHER Question 1 OR Question 2.

EITHER

1 ‘The Austro-German alliance of 1879 served German rather than Austro-Hungarian interests in the years 1879–1914.’ How far do you agree with this view?

(Total for Question 1 = 30 marks)

OR

2 ‘Economic circumstances determined the success or failure of the disarmament policies pursued by the major powers in the years 1921–33.’ How far do you agree with this view?

(Total for Question 2 = 30 marks)

E2 – A World Divided: Superpower Relations, 1944–90

Answer EITHER Question 3 OR Question 4.

EITHER

3 ‘The nuclear arms race did little to restrain the actions of the USA and the Soviet Union in the Cold War in the years 1949–63.’ How far do you agree with this view?

(Total for Question 3 = 30 marks)

OR

4 ‘Neither the USA nor the Soviet Union were seriously committed to Détente in the 1970s.’ How far do you agree with this view?

(Total for Question 4 = 30 marks)

TOTAL FOR SECTION A = 30 MARKS
SECTION A

Put a cross in the box indicating the first question you have chosen to answer ☑. If you change your mind, put a line through the box ☒ and then put a cross in another box ☑.

Chosen Question Number:

Question 1 ☐       Question 2 ☐
Question 3 ☐       Question 4 ☐
(Section A continued)
(Section A continued)
SECTION B

Answer ONE question in Section B on the topic for which you have been prepared.

You should start the answer to your chosen question in Section B on page 13.

E1 – The World in Crisis, 1879–1941

Study the relevant sources in the Sources Insert.

Answer EITHER Question 5 OR Question 6.

EITHER

5 Use Sources 1, 2 and 3 and your own knowledge.

‘The League of Nations was unsuccessful during the interwar period because it could neither win over nor restrain the powers which were dissatisfied with the post-war international order.’ How far do you agree with this view?

Explain your answer, using Sources 1, 2 and 3 and your own knowledge of the issues related to this controversy.

(Total for Question 5 = 40 marks)

OR

6 Use Sources 4, 5 and 6 and your own knowledge.

‘The development of war between China and Japan in 1937 was due primarily to Chiang Kai-shek.’ How far do you agree with this view?

Explain your answer, using Sources 4, 5 and 6 and your own knowledge of the issues related to this controversy.

(Total for Question 6 = 40 marks)
E2 – A World Divided: Superpower Relations, 1944–90

Study the relevant sources in the Sources Insert.
Answer EITHER Question 7 OR Question 8.

EITHER

7 Use Sources 7, 8 and 9 and your own knowledge.

How far do you agree with the view that, in the years 1945–50, the Cold War developed as a result of US and Soviet security needs?

Explain your answer, using Sources 7, 8 and 9 and your own knowledge of the issues related to this controversy.

(Total for Question 7 = 40 marks)

OR

8 Use Sources 10, 11 and 12 and your own knowledge.

‘Mikhail Gorbachev’s rejection of old Soviet thinking on foreign affairs in the mid to late 1980s brought the Cold War to an end.’ How far do you agree with this view?

Explain your answer, using Sources 10, 11 and 12 and your own knowledge of the issues related to this controversy.

(Total for Question 8 = 40 marks)

TOTAL FOR SECTION B = 40 MARKS
SECTION B

Put a cross in the box indicating the second question you have chosen to answer ☒. If you change your mind, put a line through the box ☐ and then put a cross in another box ☒.

Chosen Question Number:

Question 5 ☐ Question 6 ☐
Question 7 ☐ Question 8 ☐
Sources for use with Section B. Answer ONE question in Section B on the topic for which you have been prepared.

E1 – The World in Crisis, 1879–1941

Sources for use with Question 5

SOURCE 1

1 The moral authority of the League suffered from what was perceived to be the hypocrisy and self-serving of the ‘satisfied’ powers. This situation made it difficult for Britain and France to resist the claims of other states in the 1930s that wanted to build an empire. The Soviet Union was excluded from the League because of its communist credentials. Lenin regarded it as an instrument to promote world capitalism and imperialism – the “Robbers’ League”. Though Germany was admitted to the League in 1926, this did little to dispel the issue of how to contain a country with a strong national and militarist tradition, a powerful industrial economy, and a permanent grudge against the Peace Settlement. Britain and France were faced with states which had little sympathy for an international order so obviously constructed in the interests of the major empires. Two of these states, Germany and the Soviet Union, harboured very specific ambitions to overturn the post-war territorial arrangements as soon as an opportunity presented itself.

SOURCE 2

Britain, France and the United States would not risk war in the 1930s to uphold the League’s ideals when the aggressors were the other great powers – Japan, Italy and Germany and the Soviet Union. The League’s weakness was due to the fact that each member could, in effect, decide whether or not to comply with a Council request to apply sanctions. Furthermore, the Council, consisting of permanent great power members, together with some smaller states, could act only unanimously, so that any one of its members could block all action. The League was not a world government and lacked armed force. It remained dependent on the free cooperation of its members to behave according to its principles and to join with others in punishing those states that did not.

SOURCE 3

Given the unstable and impoverished conditions of large parts of Europe after 1919, and the growing antagonism between Britain and France, it is hardly surprising that the League should have failed to make a significant political impact. Without the United States and Russia, the League was not a truly world-wide organisation. In Japan and Italy it had two leading members intent on pursuing their own expansionist ambitions regardless of the effect this would have on the League or world peace. Britain and France were left to steer the League through a number of crises and challenges to its authority, and they tried to steer it in opposing directions.
Chiang Kai-shek was looked upon as the only man who could lead the Chinese nation in resistance to any further Japanese encroachments. This ironically coincided with a Japanese policy of drawing back from conflict with China. However, any hope of avoiding a conflict vanished with the Marco Polo Bridge incident near Beijing in July 1937. This was a Sino-Japanese clash that the Japanese would have been content to settle in return for a few local concessions. It was Chiang who raised the stakes by sending in his own troops to reinforce those of the local warlord and by rejecting any compromise. Japan quickly occupied Beijing and Tientsin but Chiang was unworried; he calmly expected the United States, the Soviet Union or both to declare war on Japan. When that did not happen he raised the stakes further by extending the war to the commercial capital of Shanghai which had thousands of Western residents.

The deepening Japanese inroads into China during the mid-1930s provoked more and more Chinese outrage. In 1937, public anger finally forced Chiang Kai-shek to abandon his established policy of trading space for time: yielding concessions to the Kwantung Army while readying his own forces for the struggle and, in the interim, attempting to suppress the growing Chinese Communist movement of Mao Tse-tung. Because of this policy shift, in July of that year, a minor collision between Japanese and Chinese troops near Peking (the Marco Polo Bridge Incident) escalated into all-out war.

The full-scale war that broke out between China and Japan in 1937 was the final act of a drama in which Japan had sought to preserve its economic and political rights in China in the face of both a reinvigorated Chinese nationalism and the increasing hostility of Britain and the USA. At the same time Japan saw the war as the first step in the creation of a new order in East Asia, one in which China would finally realise that its true interests lay in partnership with Japan against the twin evils of Soviet communism and Western liberal democracy. Japan’s actions in China, however, revealed the very fragile distinction between partnership and domination. At the same time Japanese government and military leaders failed to understand that the idea of a new order in East Asia never appealed to the Chinese because Chinese nationalism was directed just as much against Japan as it was against the West.
The dynamics of the Cold War are easier to understand when one grasps the American conception of national security. This included a strategic sphere of influence in the Western Hemisphere, domination of the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, access to the markets and resources of Eurasia, and nuclear superiority. Challenges to this concept of national security were certain to provoke a firm American response. This occurred initially when decisions were made in favour of the Truman doctrine, Marshall Plan, military assistance, Atlantic alliance, and German and Japanese rehabilitation. The ‘loss’ of China, Soviet detonation of an atomic bomb, and the North Korean attack on South Korea intensified the perception of a national security threat. Truman responded with military assistance to southeast Asia, a decision to build the hydrogen bomb, direct military intervention in Korea, a commitment to station troops permanently in Europe, expansion of the American alliance system, and a massive US rearmament programme.

The Cold War was the product of a dilemma. Each side felt compelled to adopt policies which the other could only regard as a threat. Each then felt compelled to undertake defensive measures. The Russians saw no choice but to consolidate their security in Eastern Europe. The Americans, regarding Eastern Europe as the first step toward Western Europe, responded by asserting their interest in the zone the Russians regarded as vital for their security. The Russians concluded the West were planning capitalist encirclement and laying the foundations for anti-Soviet regimes in this key area. Each side, in pursuing its own deeply held principles, was only confirming the other’s fear that it was bent on aggression.

The USA and the USSR had diametrically opposite interests. Both states aimed to expand their global power and were not too scrupulous about the methods used. They also had opposing ideologies. Each was armed to the teeth. Each knew little about the politicians and society of the other side. Was the balance of responsibility equal? No, because the USSR depended much more directly than its rival upon militarism, terror and injustice to get its way. There was as much financial and political persuasion as manipulation and force at work in the American domination of Western Europe. But manipulation and force was the predominant method of the USSR in Eastern Europe.
E2 – A World Divided: Superpower Relations, 1944–90

Sources for use with Question 8

SOURCE 10
(From Geoffrey Roberts, The Soviet Union in World Politics, published 1999)

Gorbachev's New Thinking on Soviet foreign policy broke with the 'old thinking' of the previous communist regime. In effect, Gorbachev de-ideologised Soviet foreign policy by detaching peaceful coexistence from revolutionary ideology and politics. Gorbachev's new approach was vital to the achievement of a renewed détente with the US and western Europe in 1985–88. However it was not until 1989 that the full implications of Gorbachev's new foreign policy became apparent. In 1989 the communist regimes of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Hungary, Poland and Romania collapsed. The conditions for this collapse were created by Gorbachev's encouragement and support for radical political reform in eastern Europe. Gorbachev's repudiation of the Brezhnev Doctrine and his willingness to give up Soviet control of eastern Europe made this possible.

SOURCE 11
(From D. Deudney and G. J. Ikenberry, Who Won the Cold War?, published 1992)

Ronald Reagan's military and ideological assertiveness during the 1980s played the lead role in the collapse of Soviet communism and the taming of its foreign policy. It delivered the knock-out punch to a system that was internally bankrupt. As former Pentagon officials like Caspar Weinberger and Richard Perle, and others, have argued, a combination of military and ideological pressures forced the Soviets to abandon expansionism abroad and repression at home. The Reagan military build-up limited Soviet military options while pushing the Soviet economy to breaking point. Reagan's supporters stress that his dramatic 'Star Wars' initiative showed the Soviets that the next phase of the arms race would be waged in areas where the West held a decisive technological advantage.

SOURCE 12
(From Merrilyn Thomas, The Cold War, published 2009)

Regardless of the actions of the two superpowers and their leaders, throughout Eastern Europe the cracks were growing deeper. The citizens of the Soviet bloc were taking matters into their own hands. In 1985 there were Solidarity-led boycotts of elections in Poland and 1988 saw another wave of strikes throughout the country. In Hungary, Karoly Grosz, known as a reformer, became party leader and replaced the old guard on the central committee. The Hungarian communist party, in October 1989, reformed itself as a social democratic party. In Czechoslovakia, leading dissidents demanded the release of human rights activist Vaclav Havel in January 1989. And in East Germany, thousands took advantage of less secure borders and lax visa requirements by packing their bags for holidays in Hungary and crossing the border into Austria. Thousands more took to the streets of Leipzig, Dresden and East Berlin demanding reforms, basic rights and freedoms.