Edexcel GCE
History
Advanced
Unit 3
Option E: War and Peace: Twentieth Century International Relations

Tuesday 12 June 2012 – Morning
Time: 2 hours

You must have:
Sources Insert (enclosed)

Instructions
• Use black ink or ball-point pen.
• Fill in the boxes at the top of this page with your name, centre number and candidate number.
• There are two sections in this question paper. Answer one question from Section A and one question from Section B on the topic for which you have been prepared.
• Answer the questions in the spaces provided – there may be more space than you need.

Information
• The total mark for this paper is 70.
• The marks for each question are shown in brackets – use this as a guide to how much time to spend on each question.
• The quality of your written communication will be assessed in all your responses – you should take particular care with your spelling, punctuation and grammar, as well as the clarity of expression.

Advice
• Read each question carefully before you start to answer it.
• Keep an eye on the time.
• Check your answers if you have time at the end.
SECTION A

Answer ONE question in Section A on the topic for which you have been prepared.

You should start the answer to your chosen question in Section A on page 3. Section B begins on page 11.

E1 – The World in Crisis, 1879–1941

Answer EITHER Question 1 OR Question 2.

EITHER

1 ‘The Balkan crisis of summer 1914 was the occasion for, rather than the cause of, the First World War.’ How far do you agree with this view?  
(Total for Question 1 = 30 marks)

OR

2 How far do you agree with the view that the peace treaties of 1919–22 were vicious and short-sighted?  
(Total for Question 2 = 30 marks)

E2 – A World Divided: Superpower Relations, 1944–90

Answer EITHER Question 3 OR Question 4.

EITHER

3 ‘In the years 1953–60, President Eisenhower’s cold war diplomacy was based on confrontation rather than coexistence.’ How far do you agree with this view?  
(Total for Question 3 = 30 marks)

OR

4 ‘The improvement in Sino-US relations was the main factor promoting détente between Russia and America in the years 1969–75.’ How far do you agree with this view?  
(Total for Question 4 = 30 marks)

TOTAL FOR SECTION A = 30 MARKS
SECTION A

Put a cross in the box indicating the first question you have chosen to answer. If you change your mind, put a line through the box and then put a cross in another box.

Chosen Question Number:

- Question 1
- Question 2
- Question 3
- Question 4
SECTION B

Answer ONE question in Section B on the topic for which you have been prepared.

You should start the answer to your chosen question in Section B on page 13.

E1 – The World in Crisis, 1879–1941

Study the relevant sources in the Sources Insert.
Answer EITHER Question 5 OR Question 6.

EITHER

5 Use Sources 1, 2 and 3 and your own knowledge.

How far do you agree with the view that the weakness of the League of Nations during the interwar period was due primarily to the USA's isolationist policy?

Explain your answer, using Sources 1, 2 and 3 and your own knowledge of the issues related to this controversy.

(Total for Question 5 = 40 marks)

OR

6 Use Sources 4, 5 and 6 and your own knowledge.

‘The USA decided to confront Japan in 1941 mainly in order to defend its economic interests in the Far East.’ How far do you agree with this view?

Explain your answer, using Sources 4, 5 and 6 and your own knowledge of the issues related to this controversy.

(Total for Question 6 = 40 marks)
E2 – A World Divided: Superpower Relations, 1944–90

Study the relevant sources in the Sources Insert.
Answer EITHER Question 7 OR Question 8.

EITHER

7 Use Sources 7, 8 and 9 and your own knowledge.

How far do you agree with the view that superpower misjudgements account for the development of the Cold War in the years 1945–53?

Explain your answer, using Sources 7, 8 and 9 and your own knowledge of the issues related to this controversy.

(Total for Question 7 = 40 marks)

OR

8 Use Sources 10, 11 and 12 and your own knowledge.

‘The Cold War came to an end because the Soviet bloc was fatally undermined by popular protests in Eastern Europe.’ How far do you agree with this view?

Explain your answer, using Sources 10, 11 and 12 and your own knowledge of the issues related to this controversy.

(Total for Question 8 = 40 marks)

TOTAL FOR SECTION B = 40 MARKS
### SECTION B

Put a cross in the box indicating the second question you have chosen to answer. If you change your mind, put a line through the box and then put a cross in another box.

Chosen Question Number:

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question 5</th>
<th>Question 6</th>
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<td>Question 7</td>
<td>Question 8</td>
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</table>
Sources for use with Section B. Answer ONE question in Section B on the topic for which you have been prepared.

E1 – The World in Crisis, 1879–1941

Sources for use with Question 5

SOURCE 1
(From Richard Overy, The Origins of the Second World War, published 1987)

A year after the end of the war the United States turned its back on Europe. Congress refused to ratify the Versailles Treaty or to join the League of Nations. American public opinion was strongly isolationist. The feeling was widespread that the United States had been led into war by profiteers and bankers in order to shore up the French and British empires whose role in world affairs the Americans deeply distrusted. The major priority of American foreign policy was to avoid fighting another war for Europe. Yet the USA had become, by the 1920s, the world's largest economy, backed up by vast material and human resources. She possessed great potential military and economic resources, but chose, for domestic reasons, not to exert it in the international arena. The American position carried the danger that Germany, Italy and Japan would be encouraged to pursue an adventurous foreign policy.

SOURCE 2
(From an article by Adam Roberts, Towards a World Community?, published 1998)

The League of Nations failed partly because its proposed mechanisms for achieving security were inherently flawed. The idea of collective responses to acts of aggression could not work when there was no agreement among states as to whether particular acts constituted aggression; when there were arguments about whether economic sanctions or military force were appropriate responses to such acts; and when the League's decision-making procedures required unanimity, which was simply not attainable on most security issues in the 1920s and 1930s. The League earnestly discussed major crises – and it heard powerful pleas for action against Japanese, Italian and German uses of force in the 1930s – but its responses were ineffective.

SOURCE 3
(From A. J. P. Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War, published 1964)

There was a deep, underlying divergence between England and France as to the nature of the League of Nations. The French wanted the League to develop into a system of security directed against Germany; the British regarded it as a system of conciliation which would include Germany. The French believed that the First World War had been caused by German aggression; the British came more and more to hold that it had happened by mistake. The two countries never argued this difference out to a conclusion. Both the British and French governments were too distracted by domestic and foreign difficulties to have a clear and consistent policy.
E1 – The World in Crisis, 1879–1941

Sources for use with Question 6

SOURCE 4
(From David Williamson, War and Peace: International Relations 1914–45, published 1994)

It is tempting to argue that the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 was inevitable. Japan, regarding herself as a ‘have not’ power, attempted to guarantee her access to markets and raw materials by gradually dominating economically and politically not only China but the whole of south-east Asia. To the Americans, it was both practical economics and a strongly held belief that they should be able to trade and invest freely in China and elsewhere. Washington responded to each fresh extension of Japanese power not only by building up its naval forces in the Pacific but by restricting more and more tightly the exports of potential war materials to Japan. This measure only intensified the Japanese drive for economic self-sufficiency. Both sides seemed therefore to be on a collision course.

SOURCE 5
(From Hugh Brogan, The Penguin History of the USA, published 1999)

Japanese expansionism created enormous difficulties for America. She might have accepted and traded with the new Japanese empire but this would have been to conspire with an aggressor nation against the people of China and to accept Japanese imperialism. This would have led to a quarrel with the European democracies (Japan’s rivals and America’s friends), who were also, by an unfortunate chance, the only important European powers in the Far East. It would also have brought on a ceaseless storm of protest from the American businessmen and missionaries who still hoped to exploit China themselves. Besides, the USA had colonies in the Pacific (the Philippines, Guam, Hawaii) which were inadequately defended. Now Japan was the predominant naval power in the western Pacific she could pick off America’s possessions at any time. The possibility did not make Washington feel any more kindly towards Japan.

SOURCE 6

In 1940–41, it became clear to the United States government that the desperate position of Britain at Germany’s mercy in Europe and the Japanese threat to the British Empire in Asia were combining to present a serious threat to the United States’ own security. If Britain was defeated or sued for peace, German power might extend over the Atlantic Ocean. And in the Far East, in September 1940, the American ambassador in Tokyo reported to Washington that ‘American interests in the Pacific are definitely threatened by Japan’s policy of southward expansion, which is a threat at the British Empire in the East’. The existence of the British Empire was itself an element in America’s security system.
Sources for use with Section B. Answer ONE question in Section B on the topic for which you have been prepared.

E2 – A World Divided: Superpower Relations, 1944–90

Sources for use with Question 7

SOURCE 7

The greater strength of the US political and economic system, compared with that of the USSR, gave Washington greater opportunities to change the post-war world. Had they so desired, the Americans could have recognised the Soviet sphere of influence in eastern and south-eastern Europe, drawn the Soviets into joint control of atomic weapons, and contributed to the reconstruction of the Soviet economy.

American decision-makers misread Soviet security interests in eastern and south-eastern Europe as proof of Soviet expansionism and refused to cooperate. This, in turn, led the Soviets to see US policy as aggressive capitalist expansionism and to harden their own attitude in their own sphere of influence. A vicious circle thus came into being and it could not be broken after 1945.

SOURCE 8
(From Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev*, published 1996)

Stalin’s road to the Cold War, in the years after 1946, was strewn with miscalculations. He did not want to provoke American and British ‘imperialism’, yet he overreacted to any perceived threat in Germany and in Eastern Europe. In response to the Marshall Plan, Stalin began to consolidate a Soviet security zone in Eastern Europe by ruthless police methods and intensive Communist propaganda. Trying to stop Western separatist policies in Germany, he triggered the Berlin blockade crisis. By sanctioning North Korean aggression, Stalin subjected the Koreans, his Chinese ally, and the rest of the world to a bloody and protracted war that contained the real danger of a global conflict.

SOURCE 9

Two nations with quite different ideologies emerged from the rubble of World War Two to claim high rank. The United States and the Soviet Union, eager to realise their visions of the post-war world and to seize opportunities for extending their respective influence, tried to fill vacuums of power. Although handicapped by its economic wreckage, Russia held predominant post-war power over its East European neighbours. Still, the Soviet Union was a regional, not a global, power before the early 1950s. The United States had more opportunities and resources than other nations to shape the post-war system. By exercising their global power – through military occupations, foreign aid and loans, and domination of the United Nations – US officials pushed the world toward the American post-war goal of a non-radical, capitalist, free trade international order.
E2 – A World Divided: Superpower Relations, 1944–90

Sources for use with Question 8

SOURCE 10
(From C. B. Jones, The Cold War, published 2004)

During the late 1980s, the Soviet grip on the countries of Eastern Europe was finally loosened because of changes within the USSR itself and because, within the countries of the Eastern bloc, there was growing opposition to the ‘communist way’. Many East Europeans wanted a choice of political parties for whom they could vote in free elections following free and frank political campaigns. Increasingly, the state-controlled economies were seen as inefficient, unable to produce sufficient food or consumer goods for the people. The 1980s had also seen the standard of living decline in Eastern Europe – prices and unemployment had risen. In certain East European countries, such as Poland, many people now pushed for freedom of religious worship. Nationalism also played a part in the downfall of Soviet influence with more East European nations wanting a government that would act in the interests of its citizens rather than some external power.

SOURCE 11

The Cold War ended when one or both the superpowers recognised the absurdity of the nuclear arms race, and when one or both accepted the other’s sincerity in wishing to end it. It was probably easier for a Soviet leader to take this initiative because the Cold War had never been seen by Moscow in the crusading terms common in Washington. On the other hand, just for this reason, it would be harder for a Soviet leader to convince the West that he meant business. That is why the world owes so enormous a debt to Gorbachev, who not only took this initiative but succeeded, singlehanded, in convincing the US government and others in the West that he meant what he said. However, let us not underestimate the contribution of Reagan, whose simple-minded idealism broke through the unusually dense screen of Washington ideologues, fanatics and professional warriors around him to let him be convinced.

SOURCE 12
(From Michael L. Dockrill and Michael F. Hopkins, The Cold War, published 2006)

Although the case for Gorbachev’s crucial role in ending the Cold War is very persuasive, it begs the question why he came to believe that he had to follow this course of action. The essential answer lies in the failure of the Soviet system. By the 1980s there were enormous economic problems. What made it especially bad was that these surfaced at a time when the US economy was leaping forward thanks to what some called another industrial revolution with the emergence of computer technology and the arrival of the ‘information age’.
Acknowledgements

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