Instructions

- Use black ink or ball-point pen.
- Fill in the boxes at the top of this page with your name, centre number and candidate number.
- There are two sections in this question paper. Answer ONE question from Section A and ONE question from Section B on the topic for which you have been prepared.
- Answer the questions in the spaces provided – there may be more space than you need.

Information

- The total mark for this paper is 70.
- The marks for each question are shown in brackets – use this as a guide as to how much time to spend on each question.
- The quality of your written communication will be assessed in ALL your responses – you should take particular care with your spelling, punctuation and grammar, as well as the clarity of expression.

Advice

- Read each question carefully before you start to answer it.
- Keep an eye on the time.
- Check your answers if you have time at the end.
SECTION A

Answer ONE question in Section A on the topic for which you have been prepared.

You should start the answer to your chosen question in Section A on page 3. Section B begins on page 11.

E1 – The World in Crisis, 1879–1941

Answer EITHER Question 1 OR Question 2.

EITHER

1 ‘The system of European alliances operating in the years 1879–1914 bears little responsibility for the outbreak of the First World War in August 1914.’ How far do you agree with this view?

(Total for Question 1 = 30 marks)

OR

2 ‘The peace treaties of 1919–23 were firmly based on President Wilson’s Fourteen Points.’ How far do you agree with this view?

(Total for Question 2 = 30 marks)

E2 – A World Divided: Superpower Relations, 1944–90

Answer EITHER Question 3 OR Question 4.

EITHER

3 ‘US-Soviet relations did not fundamentally improve in the 1970s.’ How far do you agree with this view?

(Total for Question 3 = 30 marks)

OR

4 To what extent was the nuclear arms race a stabilising factor in the Cold War between 1949 and 1963?

(Total for Question 4 = 30 marks)

TOTAL FOR SECTION A = 30 MARKS
SECTION A

Put a cross in the box indicating the first question you have chosen to answer □. If you change your mind, put a line through the box □ and then put a cross in another box □.

Chosen Question Number:

Question 1 □ Question 2 □
Question 3 □ Question 4 □
SECTION B

Answer ONE question in Section B on the topic for which you have been prepared.

You should start the answer to your chosen question in Section B on page 13.

E1 – The World in Crisis, 1879–1941

Study the relevant sources in the Sources Insert.
Answer EITHER Question 5 OR Question 6.

EITHER

5 Use Sources 1, 2 and 3 and your own knowledge.

How far do you agree with the view that the League of Nations was unsuccessful in the interwar period because it served only British and French interests?

Explain your answer, using Sources 1, 2 and 3 and your own knowledge of the issues related to this controversy.

(Total for Question 5 = 40 marks)

OR

6 Use Sources 4, 5 and 6 and your own knowledge.

‘Hitler’s decision to invade the Soviet Union in June 1941 was driven primarily by economic necessities.’

How far do you agree with this opinion? Explain your answer, using Sources 4, 5 and 6 and your own knowledge of the issues related to this controversy.

(Total for Question 6 = 40 marks)
E2 – A World Divided: Superpower Relations, 1944–90

Study the relevant sources in the Sources Insert.
Answer EITHER Question 7 OR Question 8.

EITHER

7 Use Sources 7, 8 and 9 and your own knowledge.

How far do you agree with the view that the development of the Cold War between the USA and the Soviet Union in the years 1945–53 was primarily due to traditional great power rivalry?

Explain your answer, using Sources 7, 8 and 9 and your own knowledge of the issues related to this controversy.

(Total for Question 7 = 40 marks)

OR

8 Use Sources 10, 11 and 12 and your own knowledge.

‘The Cold War came to an end mainly because of President Ronald Reagan’s policies towards the Soviet Union.’ How far do you agree with this opinion?

Explain your answer, using Sources 10, 11 and 12 and your own knowledge of the issues related to this controversy.

(Total for Question 8 = 40 marks)

TOTAL FOR SECTION B = 40 MARKS
SECTION B

Put a cross in the box indicating the second question you have chosen to answer ☐. If you change your mind, put a line through the box ☒ and then put a cross in another box ☐.

Chosen Question Number:

Question 5 ☐          Question 6 ☐
Question 7 ☐          Question 8 ☐
(Section B continued)
Sources for use with Section B. Answer ONE question in Section B on the topic for which you have been prepared.

E1 – The World in Crisis, 1879–1941

Sources for use with Question 5

SOURCE 1
(From James Joll, *Europe Since 1870*, published 1976)

1 The League of Nations had originally been conceived by President Wilson as a world organisation, and it did indeed in the 1920s occupy itself to some extent and with some success with non-European problems. However, the American retreat into isolation deprived the League of a whole non-European dimension. It left it in the hands of those European great powers, especially France and Britain, preoccupied above all with the establishment of a stable system of security in Europe. At the same time the ideal which the League was to serve had been changed. Wilson had hoped that it would provide machinery for improving and revising the peace settlement. The French, on the other hand, came to regard it increasingly as a means for upholding the peace treaties and for preventing their revision.

SOURCE 2

Many seriously believed that the establishment of the League of Nations meant the elimination of power from international relations and the substitution of discussion for armies and navies. ‘Power politics’ became a term of abuse. This belief persisted during the 1920s because the nations whose main interest was the preservation of the post-war settlement enjoyed, throughout that time, a virtual monopoly of power. What was commonly called the ‘return to power politics’ in 1931 was, in fact, the ending of this monopoly of power enjoyed by Britain and France. And within the League of Nations, formal equality and open debates did not render the power factor any less decisive.

SOURCE 3
(From David Thomson, *Europe Since Napoleon*, published 1966)

20 The League of Nations was in no sense a superstate or a federation or a world government. It was not a government of any kind, but only a facility to be used by state governments in order to keep the peace. It was an apparatus of standing machinery created by a covenant among states to eliminate frictions among them and make possible timely common action against any threat to the peace of the world. It made sense and offered prospects of peace only if certain assumptions about the post-war world proved correct. These assumptions were that most governments would want peace, would shun war as a means of advancing national interests, and would have the will to use the new machinery. Once these expectations were disappointed, there remained no cohesive force which might give the League of Nations the vitality and vigour of action that it needed.
E1 – The World in Crisis, 1879–1941
Sources for use with Question 6

SOURCE 4
(From Ian Kershaw, Hitler 1936–45: Nemesis, published 2000)

Hitler’s inability to bring Britain to the conference table had provided the spur to contemplate the bold move of a strike in the East, even while the contest in the West remained unsettled. The driving-force was the perceived shortage of time, given the looming threat of the USA and the near-certainty of at least indirect US involvement in the war through massive supplies of material if the war dragged into a further year. The need to secure unlimited sources of raw materials from Soviet territory and to ensure that there would be no interruption to oil supplies from Romania was an additional central motive. Ideological considerations – the need to eradicate Bolshevism once and for all – had not been the deciding factor in the timing of the showdown. But they gave it its indelible colouring, its sense not just of war, but of crusade.

SOURCE 5
(From S. J. Lee, European Dictatorships 1918–1945, 3rd edition, published 2008)

Operation Barbarossa was a pre-emptive strike against the Soviet Union which was becoming a looming military threat. Stalin had taken the decision during the 1930s to prepare for an offensive war at a time of his choosing and had, accordingly, stockpiled huge quantities of weapons. It must have seemed to Hitler that, by 1941, the gap was growing rapidly between the military strength of the two powers. Stalin would clearly attack eventually and the best chance Germany had of taking the Soviet Union was by getting in first, especially since Stalin was prepared to go to great lengths to avoid a war until he was ready. Besides, Hitler’s hands were free at the time: France had been smashed and Britain, although undefeated, was unable to bring the war to the continent. The most appropriate time for another major campaign was therefore 1941.

SOURCE 6
(From P. M. H. Bell, The Origins of the Second World War in Europe, 3rd edition, published 2007)

The German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941 stands as the culminating point of two of the underlying forces making for war in the 1930s and early 1940s: ideology and economics. The racial obsessions of Nazism, its hostility to Bolshevism and its determination to conquer living space and sources of raw materials, were worked out over the whole period, and took final shape in the great war in the east. To these may be added the third underlying force: strategy and military thought. A misleading over-confidence in the German military machine, fed and bloated by the astonishing victories of 1940, was an important impulse behind the attack.
Sources for use with Section B. Answer ONE question in Section B on the topic for which you have been prepared.

E2 – A World Divided: Superpower Relations, 1944–90

Sources for use with Question 7

**SOURCE 7**

1 Confrontation would probably have developed even without ideology. George Kennan, the American diplomat who in early 1946 formulated the USA’s containment policy, did not believe Russia was crusading for communism. He was an expert of the old school of diplomatic power politics. He saw Russia, Tsarist or Bolshevik, as a backward and barbarous society ruled by men with a ‘traditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity’, who saw ‘security’ only in the total destruction of rival power. Communism, in Kennan’s opinion, made Russia more dangerous because it was the most ruthless of world-conquering ideologies. But the implication of Kennan’s view was that the only ‘rival power’ to Russia, namely the USA, would have to ‘contain’ its pressure by uncompromising resistance, even if Russia had not been communist.

**SOURCE 8**

US planners viewed the establishment of a freer and more open international economic system as indispensable to the post-war order. Closed trading blocs and national economic barriers encouraged only rivalry and conflict. Marxism-Leninism influenced the outlook and policies of the Soviet Union. Stalin and the Kremlin elite assumed conflict between the socialist and capitalist worlds to be inevitable, and were certain that proletarian revolution would prevail. Ideology imparted to Soviets and Americans alike a strong faith in the world-historical roles of their respective nations. On each side, leaders and ordinary citizens saw their countries acting for much broader purposes than the mere advancement of national interests. Soviets and Americans each saw themselves acting out of noble motives to lead humanity into a grand new age of peace, justice and order. Married to the overwhelming power each nation possessed, those mirror-opposite ideological values provided a sure-fire recipe for conflict.

**SOURCE 9**
(From John Lewis Gaddis, *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History*, published 1997)

25 Stalin’s centrality to the origins of the Cold War is clear. For all their importance, one could have removed Roosevelt, Churchill, Truman and others, and a cold war would still have probably started. If one could have eliminated Stalin, alternative paths become quite conceivable. For, with the possible exception of Mao, no twentieth century leader imprinted himself upon his country as Stalin did. And given his tendency to conduct ‘domestic’ cold wars, once Stalin was in control and once it was clear Russia would survive the war, then it looks equally clear that there was going to be a Cold War whatever the west did. Who was responsible? The answer is authoritarianism in general, and Stalin in particular.
E2 – A World Divided: Superpower Relations, 1944–90

Sources for use with Question 8

SOURCE 10
(From an article by Patrick Glynn in Foreign Policy, published 1993)

It was only after three or four years of tough policies under Reagan that the desired change in the Soviet leaders’ views took place. That was Reagan’s plan – to negotiate from a position of strength. He re-established a position of strength through a massive arms build-up, through deliberately tough talk, through uncompromising positions on arms control, through active harassment of Soviet imperial efforts in the Third World, through tightening technological export controls and through the frightening prospect (for the Soviets) of the Strategic Defence Initiative. Jimmy Carter’s approach of rewarding the Soviet build-up with one-sided arms control treaties, of opening Moscow’s access to Western markets, and of condoning Soviet imperial expansion, delivered the Soviets from any need to re-evaluate their policies. Had the basic Carter approach been continued, the Cold War would almost certainly have been prolonged.

SOURCE 11

In 1989 the structure of international relations was dramatically transformed from ‘below’ by the ‘revolutions’ in Eastern Europe. The West looked on in amazement as the people of Eastern Europe spontaneously took the initiative in bringing about the peaceful overthrow of the Iron Curtain. A critical factor in their success was undoubtedly Gorbachev’s decision not to resort to military retaliation. The Soviet leader had hoped that perestroika would be received positively in the satellite states. However, his celebrated speech at the United Nations in December 1988 had stated that all nations possessed ‘freedom of choice’. The people of Eastern Europe took him at his word and opted for the West as their preferred model of political, economic and moral progress.

SOURCE 12
(From Jeremy Isaacs and Taylor Downing, Cold War, published 1998)

The real balance of economic power between the Soviet Union and its empire was heavily weighted against the USSR. The vast reserves of oil, gas, and metal ores in Siberia should have made the Soviet Union a wealthy country. But the USSR made energy and raw materials available at low cost to its socialist allies, who had little to offer in return. The USSR’s annual subsidy to its Warsaw Pact allies through the discounting of oil prices amounted to about $3 billion. This state of affairs locked the entire Warsaw Pact into obsolescence* and kept the Soviet Union in relative poverty. The defence budget absorbed about 50 per cent of the Soviet Union’s gross national product annually. Gorbachev knew no social change was possible without ending the arms race with the West. Only this would free up the gigantic sums spent on the military.

* obsolescence = backwardness