Alexander Kerensky Facts & Worksheets

• The Provisional Government’s fundamental weakness stemmed from the system of ‘dual power’ established after the February Revolution. While the Government held nominal state authority, real power on the streets of Petrograd lay with the Petrograd Soviet, which controlled the troops and factories. The Soviets’ famous ‘Order No. 1’ had placed military units under its political control, leaving the Government without a reliable means to enforce its decrees. This created a paralytic stalemate: the Government could not act decisively without the Soviets’ approval, while the Soviets refused to take formal responsibility for the state’s administration. 
• Kerensky’s unique position as a leading figure in both bodies was ultimately untenable, as he struggled to bridge an ever-widening gulf between moderate socialist ministers and the Soviets’ increasingly radical demands.

Minister of Justice

• Kerensky implemented a variety of liberal policies while serving as Justice Minister. He lifted some limitations on free speech and the press, abolished the death sentence and ordered the release of political prisoners. Because these efforts represented a considerable departure from past Tsarist rule, many Russians admired them. They did, however, diminish the government’s authority. Radical groups, such as the Bolsheviks, could now freely organise and promote their ideas.
• Kerensky believed that democracy could only endure if individuals were free. He did not realise how unstable things had become or how fast people would turn against the Provisional Government.
• In May 1917, Kerensky became Minister of War and oversaw the June Offensive. One of the most pressing and contentious issues confronting the Provisional Government was Russia’s involvement in World War I.
• Many troops and labourers believed that the new government would bring an end to the war. Kerensky, on the other side, believed that withdrawing would harm Russia’s standing in the world and cause the economy to collapse. He also believed that Russia needed to keep fighting alongside its friends.
• Kerensky went to the front lines to address soldiers and encourage them to continue fighting. His words briefly buoyed spirits, but the army was exhausted, undersupplied, and hesitant to continue fighting.
• Kerensky led a major military offensive in June 1917. This attack was dubbed the June Offensive. The attack initially succeeded, but it shortly failed when men fled and refused to obey orders. Kerensky’s failure damaged his prestige and fuelled public opposition to the Provisional Government.
• Kerensky became Prime Minister in July 1917. Russia was in dire economic straits, running out of food, and an increasing number of people were embracing extreme groups. He attempted to hold other political groupings in check, but this left him alone. He refused to implement land reforms immediately, which enraged peasants, and he continued the war, which enraged soldiers. Conservative groups, on the other hand, were concerned that he was allowing Russia to slide into turmoil.
• Kerensky established Russia as a republic in September 1917. This pleased numerous socialists; however, it did little to resolve Russia’s broader challenges.

The Kornilov Affair and the October Revolution

• In August 1917, the Provisional Government faced a serious political crisis known as the Kornilov Affair. This episode weakened the authority of Alexander Kerensky and reversed much of the recovery the government had made after the July Days. At the same time, it allowed the Bolsheviks to regain support and influence.
• The exact details of the affair remain unclear, as later accounts by those involved often contradict one another. However, there is little doubt about the intentions of the central figure in the crisis, General Lavr Kornilov, who had recently been appointed commander-in-chief of the Russian army.
• Senior army officer Kornilov never accepted the February Revolution. He believed Russia could not defeat Germany without crushing internal dissent. He considered socialist parties a larger threat than the enemies outside. He advocated suppressing the Petrograd Soviet and taking forceful action against revolutionary leaders like the Bolsheviks. Late August saw Petrograd’s situation worsen. While refugees and deserters flooded the city, German advances raised safety concerns. Meanwhile, food shortages, strikes and public disturbances strained the metropolis. Kornilov warned Kerensky that a socialist insurrection threatened the Provisional administration and that he would dispatch loyal troops to Petrograd to restore order and secure the administration.
• Historians disagree over Kerensky’s role. Some argue he initially tolerated Kornilov’s plans to weaken the Petrograd Soviet but turned against him once it became clear that Kornilov aimed to overthrow the Provisional Government by force. Others maintain that Kerensky never supported Kornilov, noting that a 1917 Commission of Enquiry cleared him of responsibility. What is clear is that Kerensky ultimately opposed Kornilov publicly, dismissed him, ordered troops to halt, and declared martial law in Petrograd.
• Kerensky urged Petrograd residents to defend against Kornilov’s invasion. Workers and soldiers were encouraged to join militias and given weapons to confront the oncoming forces. This freed the Bolsheviks imprisoned following the July Days and brought others out of hiding. This group received guns from the Provisional Government. It bolstered the group that publicly challenged Kerensky’s rule, which had major implications.
• In the end, fighting did not take place. Railway workers refused to operate trains carrying Kornilov’s forces to Petrograd. At the same time, large numbers of armed workers organised to resist any attack. Faced with this opposition and the loss of support, Kornilov abandoned the advance. On 1 September 1917, he allowed himself to be arrested.
• Kornilov’s failure had political repercussions. Even though Kerensky stopped a military takeover, the Provisional Government lost power. The crisis showed how weak the government was and how much it needed popular backing it no longer had. Bolsheviks gained the most from the affair. They recovered from the July Days support loss by portraying themselves as Petrograd and revolution defenders. Workers were armed, which improved their organisation and mobilisation. Kerensky later recognised that the Kornilov Affair was important to his government’s downfall. He called it the ‘prelude to the October Revolution’ since it showed the Provisional Government’s fragility and eased the Bolshevik takeover in 1917.
• By October 1917, the authority of the Provisional Government had largely collapsed. It had failed to resolve the key issues facing Russia, including continued involvement in the war, food shortages, and demands for land reform. At the same time, public confidence in Kerensky’s leadership had declined, while support for the Bolsheviks continued to grow. Under the leadership of Vladimir Lenin, the Bolsheviks promised “Peace, Land, and Bread”, a message that appealed strongly to soldiers, workers, and peasants.
• On 6–7 November 1917 (24–25 October in the old Russian calendar), Bolshevik forces known as the Red Guards began to seize important buildings and communication centres in Petrograd. Bridges, railway stations, and government offices were taken with little resistance. This reflected the Provisional Government’s weakness, as it no longer commanded the loyalty of military forces in the capital and was therefore unable to organise an effective defence.
• The final stage of the uprising came with the capture of the Winter Palace, where the remaining members of the Provisional Government were meeting. After limited resistance, the building was taken, and the ministers were arrested. 
• Kerensky had left Petrograd earlier that day in an attempt to gather loyal troops from outside the city. However, he was unable to raise sufficient support, and his efforts to restore the government failed. With this, the Bolsheviks completed their seizure of power.
• Kerensky lived in permanent exile, first in Paris and later in New York. He pointedly refused to support either the Bolshevik regime or the White Armies during the Civil War. As a historian and lecturer, he consistently argued that Russia’s democratic potential was destroyed by polarisation and violence. 
• Kerensky died in New York in 1970 at the age of 89. Russian Orthodox churches abroad refused to conduct his funeral, holding him responsible for the collapse of the old order and the rise of Bolshevik rule. As a result, he was buried in London.