SALT Facts & Worksheets

SALT I

• In November 1969, the first round of negotiations began in Helsinki. This was an important milestone for both Washington and Moscow as they worked towards genuine dialogue. The SALT I talks were complex, finally concluding on 26 May 1972, when US President Richard Nixon and Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev signed two major agreements in Moscow. These treaties focused on placing immediate limitations on both the offensive and defensive strategic weapons systems of the two nations.

The Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty

• This treaty was arguably the most crucial element of SALT I. It addressed the defensive side of the arms race. An Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) system is designed to intercept and destroy an enemy’s Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) before it reaches its target. The treaty drastically limited both sides to deploying ABM systems at only one site each.
• The theory behind this restriction was to maintain the state of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD). A country might be tempted to launch a surprise first strike if it thought that ABM systems could protect it completely and that it could handle any retaliation. Limiting ABMs left both sides equally vulnerable, which kept either from attacking, a grim but effective way to keep the peace.
• The Soviet Union had deployed an ABM system around its capital, Moscow, as early as 1966, and it remains in use today in a modified form. The US, having initially announced plans for 12 sites in 1967, ultimately built only one ABM site to protect a Minuteman missile base in North Dakota (part of the ‘Safeguard’ programme). This US base was soon viewed as vulnerable due to Soviet advancements in missile technology, highlighting the constant challenge of arms control.

The Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive Arms

• The second agreement focused on offensive strategic weapons. It placed a five-year freeze on the number of existing strategic ballistic missile launchers, including both ICBMs (Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles) and SLBMs (Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles).
• The agreement limited the US and its NATO allies to operating a maximum of 50 SLBM-capable submarines with a ceiling of 800 SLBM launchers between them. For context, the US had already maintained a static arsenal of 1,054 ICBMs and 656 SLBMs since 1967.
• The treaty permitted both sides to increase the number of SLBM launchers, but only if an equivalent number of older ICBM launchers or SLBM launchers on older submarines were simultaneously dismantled. This allowed for modernisation but prevented a net increase in the total number of missile platforms.
• Despite the freeze on launchers, SALT I did not stop a major technological leap that was changing the nature of the arms race, the deployment of Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicle (MIRV) warheads. Instead of carrying one nuclear warhead, a single MIRV-equipped missile could carry multiple warheads (often with decoys or ‘dummies’ to confuse defences).
• Each MIRV is capable of being aimed at a different target. This meant that even though there was a limit on the number of missile tubes, a country could still deploy greater nuclear warheads, which went against the spirit of the ‘freeze’. MIRV technology made ABM defence harder and more expensive, showing how hard it is for scientists and the military to work together to control arms.
• SALT I relied on President Nixon’s détente foreign policy. He and Henry Kissinger employed the tactic of ‘linkage’. Nixon intended to ‘link’ Soviet cooperation with global issues, including the Vietnam War, Berlin’s future, and Middle East tensions to arms control success. The US created a web of diplomatic concerns to pressure the Soviet Union to act more calmly and steadily. Other historians contend that this strategy was flawed, as the US did not fully understand the Soviet Union’s objectives, which resulted in the linking policy being less successful.

SALT II

• Following the groundwork laid by SALT I, the SALT II talks began in 1972 and continued for seven years, aiming to go beyond a mere ‘freeze’ and achieve real reductions in the strategic nuclear forces of both superpowers. The talks achieved a major breakthrough at the Vladivostok Summit Meeting in November 1974, with President Gerald Ford and General Secretary Brezhnev agreeing on the basic elements. The final treaty was formally signed in Vienna on 18 June 1979, by President Jimmy Carter and General Secretary Brezhnev.
• SALT II was the first treaty to propose genuine reductions, establishing an overall ceiling of 2,250 of all categories of strategic delivery vehicles (including ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers) for each side. The agreement specifically limited the number of MIRVed ballistic missiles and long-range missiles to a total of 1,320. This was a key step towards limiting the number of warheads as well as the launchers. It banned new missile programmes defined as those with any key parameter 5% better than existing missiles, thus limiting the development of new strategic missile types.
• The US was allowed to keep key modernisation programmes, such as the Trident missile and cruise missiles (which were viewed as defensive due to their slow speed, unlike fast, first-strike-capable ballistic missiles). The Soviets, in turn, were allowed to exclusively retain 308 of their powerful ‘heavy ICBM’ launchers, notably the SS-18 type. These detailed, technical limits demonstrate the depth and complexity of the negotiations.
• Despite the successful signing, SALT II never officially became international law because it was not ratified by the legislative bodies in either nation. The political climate quickly shifted following the signing. Just six months after the treaty was signed, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in December 1979. This act of military aggression severely damaged the spirit of détente and deeply shocked the US political establishment. Compounding this tension, in September 1979, the US discovered a Soviet combat brigade stationed in Cuba (a unit that had actually been there since the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962).
• In light of these events, President Carter withdrew the treaty from consideration by the US Senate in January 1980. The Senate, whose consent is required for treaty ratification, never approved it, nor did the Soviet Union’s Supreme Soviet.

Legacy of SALT

• Despite the fact that SALT II was not ratified, the United States and the Soviet Union generally adhered to its terms until 1986, one year after it expired on 31 December 1985. This devotion, which is not legally mandated, demonstrates a common desire to halt a nuclear arms competition. The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks were succeeded by START I and START II (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties).