Ferdinand Foch Facts & Worksheets

• Foch was then assigned a new role, heading Allied units on the Italian front. Not long after this change, a shift in the French military command structure occurred, and Joffre was replaced in his position of authority.

1917

• As World War I's tactics and politics evolved, 1917 became a year of strategic reevaluation for the Allies. General Robert Nivelle's offensive failure led to the appointment of General Philippe Pétain as Chief of the General Staff, bringing Foch to prominence within the French military's higher ranks. He became chief of the war minister's general staff in May, advising the Allies.
• During this year, Foch advocated a cautious military strategy. He believed that limited strikes and the United States' substantial involvement in France would ultimately shift the balance of the war. While open to deploying heavy guns, he disagreed with British Prime Minister David Lloyd George's plans to send additional French and British troops to aid Italy in its campaign against Trieste.
• The Anglo-French command, with Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig of the British Expeditionary Force playing a key role, ultimately agreed on the relocation of artillery resources to Italy – reallocating 50 heavy guns from the French army, which, when combined with British artillery, totalled 100 guns sent to assist the Italian front. Despite Foch being the chief of the war minister's general staff, advising was not commanding. Germany could return all its forces to the Western Front, where the Belgians, English and French were under separate commands, while Russia collapsed.
• When the Germans attacked, Foch predicted that the poorly coordinated position would cause each unit to only think about itself and break up the front. He argued in favour of a single command, but David Lloyd George and Clemenceau disregarded his suggestions. Nevertheless, events proved Foch right.
• France's armies had endured monumental losses by the end of three and a half years of brutal conflict with Germany. In the wake of this, the Supreme War Council was formed on 7 November, by the Prime Minister and a minister from each of the Western Front powers, to enhance allied coordination. Military delegates, including Foch, were tasked with aligning their nations' war efforts.

1918

• Foch was a central figure on the executive board formed in January 1918, tasked with overseeing the proposed Allied General Reserve. Despite the underlying resentment from leaders such as Clemenceau and Pétain towards Foch, he and General Pétain made a bilateral pledge to support one another, committing eight French divisions.
• On 21 March, the British front in Picardy came under German attack. Subsequently, British Field Marshal Douglas Haig assessed his embarkation ports, while French General Philippe Pétain focused on Paris. Army separation commenced as a response to the escalating situation. The Germans quickly claimed victory, prompting Lloyd George and Clemenceau to recognise that only Foch could fill the void. He was appointed Généralissime, taking on the rank of Supreme Commander of the Allied Armies. In May, he was appointed commander of the Italian Front and led the Military Board of Allied Supply, ensuring strict and efficient logistical coordination to support the allied forces.
• During the sixth Supreme War Council meeting in June, Foch openly showed his discontent with the decreasing British expeditionary forces, clashing with British Prime Minister Lloyd George over what he perceived as the British government's reluctance to allocate additional troops.
• On 6 August, Foch was elevated to the rank of Marshal of France. In this critical role, he orchestrated the Hundred Days Offensive – a series of massive, coordinated Allied attacks that began on 8 August with the Battle of Amiens. This offensive proved to be a decisive factor in the war, as it caught the German forces by surprise and initiated the sequence of engagements that would lead to the end of hostilities.
• Foch's strategic pressure led to the Allied forces breaking through the Hindenburg Line, causing substantial setbacks for the German military. This ultimately led to the signing of the Armistice of Compiègne on 11 November, which required German troops to retire west of the Rhine and resulted in an end to hostilities on the Western Front.

Criticisms and Disputes

• Recognised as 'the most original military thinker of his generation', Foch was well-known for his insights into Napoleonic and Franco-Prussian conflicts and their relevance to contemporary military actions. Clausewitzian philosophy, which emphasised the necessity of conquest for success, shaped his military strategy.
• Although Foch's lectures reintroduced offensive tactics into French military thought, he was often criticised for his approach. His lectures and writings reintroduced the concept of the offensive into French military doctrine. However, the application of his theories was linked to the disastrous outcomes of early battles in the war, particularly the Battle of the Frontiers in August 1914. The initial French offensives, seen by some as overly aggressive and insufficiently coordinated, led to devastating losses and contributed to a negative view of his strategic principles.
• Moreover, his insistence on continual attacks and his emphasis on morale and the spirit of the offensive were sometimes perceived as uncaring of the realities on the ground and troops' lives. These tactics were part of the broader critique of WWI commanders who were perceived to have been out of touch with the conditions and sufferings of the troops in the trenches.
• Foch has also been criticised for his difficult personality. His stubbornness and tendency to be uncompromising stemmed from a strong sense of conviction in his military judgements, which led to clashes with other military leaders and politicians. The disputes between Foch and both French premier Georges Clemenceau and General Henri Pétain are examples where his interpersonal conflicts had political ramifications.

Post-War Period

• In January 1919, while participating in the Paris Peace Conference, Foch presented a note to the Allied plenipotentiaries, insisting that the Rhine River should serve as the western military border of a disarmed Germany. He firmly believed that the Allies needed to capitalise on their victory by permanently weakening Germany to avert any future threat to France.
• Foch believed that the Allies, with their recent victory, had the power to impose strict peace terms. He noted his concern that England might prioritise maintaining its current gains – the German colonies and fleet – over a strategic, long-lasting peace. He stressed the need for the Allies to have a strategy to ensure their needs were met on the Rhine.
• Despite his forceful advocacy for a demilitarised Rhineland under permanent Allied control, both British Prime Minister David Lloyd George and US President Woodrow Wilson opposed separating the Rhineland from Germany, fearing it would grant France excessive power.

Ultimately, a compromise was reached through the Treaty of Versailles:

• • Germany had to accept responsibility for causing the war and all related damages.
  • Imposed heavy financial reparations on Germany.
  • Limited the size of Germany's army and prohibited certain types of weapons.
  • Germany lost significant territories in Europe and all of its overseas colonies.
  • Banned the union between Germany and Austria.
  • Established the League of Nations to promote peace and prevent future conflicts.
  • Created a buffer zone between Germany and France.
  • Contributed to the creation of new states like Poland and Czechoslovakia.
  • Allied occupation of the Rhineland was mandated for a duration of 15 years.
• As a key figure in the negotiations that led to the treaty, Foch had strong reservations about the final terms. He believed it missed an opportunity to permanently weaken Germany and safeguard France's security by not separating the Rhineland from Germany and placing it under permanent Allied control. He anticipated that the limitations imposed on Germany were not stringent enough to ensure lasting peace and prevent a potential resurgence of German aggression.